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The Republic of Somalia gained independence on 1st July 1960 and nine years later General Mohamed Said Barre took power through a coup. In 1991 anarchy ensued after his expulsion and since then Somalia has been in a protracted conflict for over twenty four years with a lack of proper institutions for governance and the political capacity to function as a state. Fighting among leaders of rival factions and the lack of a stable functional government enables the Islamist militia, al Shabaab, whose objective is to establish a Somali caliphate in the entire nation, to unleash terror on Somalis and conduct terrorist activities in the region. These terrorist activities are a threat to regional stability, peace and security, and Kenya's national interests. The magnitude of the issue has led to the deployment of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace keepers and the entry of Kenya Defense Forces into Somalia to dislodge al Shabaab from their strongholds. This paper analyses the threat posed by al Shabaab and recommends an approach required to stabilize Somalia and mitigate the threat.
Al-Shabaab: The Threat To Kenya And The Horn Of Africa
Al Shabaab, which means 'the youth" or "the boys" in Arabic is a militant Islamist group founded and based in Somalia. The group has waged an insurgency against the resources, economic development, and capacity building necessary to improve the quality of life for people in a secure environment. In this strategic research project, I will present the historic background and demography of Somalia, the genesis of al Shabaab and its operations, look at the threat posed by the militia group to Kenya and the Horn of Africa region at large, as well as the strategic implications for Kenya and discuss Kenya's current strategy. The paper will also highlight current efforts, from a military perspective, and the strategies to mitigate the threat posed by al Shabaab. Finally I will conclude with recommendations for the way forward.
Historic Background and Demography of Somalia
The Somalia Republic gained independence on 1st July 1960 formed by the Union of British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland with Aden Abdullah Osman as its first elected President. Nine years later a socialist state was formed following a coup organized by Major General Mohamed Said Barre. In 1991 rebel forces ousted the Barre regime due to its authoritarian rule characterized by the persecution, imprisonment, and torture of political opponents. 2 Since the departure of Barre hunger, turmoil, factional fighting and the lack of a stable functional, central and credible government, has led Somalia to be regarded as a failed state. 3 In May 1991 northern clans within Somalia declared Somaliland an independent republic with a functioning administration, which has not subsequently been recognized by any members of the international community except Ethiopia. In 1998 the regions of northeastern Somalia centered on Garowe in the Nagaal province declared the territory an autonomous state called the Puntland State of Somalia. However, Puntland is not trying to obtain international recognition as a separate nation. 4 Somalia borders Kenya to the southwest, Ethiopia to the west, and Eritrea and Djibouti to the northwest. It is bounded by the Red Sea to the north and Indian Ocean to 3 the east. 5 The population is estimated to be 10,085,638 (July 2012 est.) made up of eighty five percent Somali, fifteen percent Bantu and five percent other ethnic groups.
The languages spoken are Somali (official), Arabic (official), English, and Italian. Sunni Islam is the official religion while Sufi Islam, which is a moderate mystical form of Islam, is also practiced. 6 Despite the lack of an effective system of governance, the economy of Somali is largely based on remittance money transfers, raising livestock, the production of leather, fishing, charcoal production and the cultivation of bananas. 7 Somali society is oriented around strong kinship networks that often serve as a source of protection, security, and patronage. The kinship structure is based on an agnatic lineage known as clan. The lineage of the pastoral Somalis are united by a common mythological perception of direct lineal descent from their forefather Samaal and the household of the Prophet Mohammed, notably the Qurayshi clan, and specifically his cousin, Aqiil Bin Abi Talib. 8 The four main clan families are the Darood who are divided into the Ogaden, to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia. 15 The resolution was implemented in January 2007 when the African Union Peace Security Council 7 authorized the deployment of the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) with the mandate to support transitional government structures, implementation of a national security plan, training of the Somali security forces, and assistance in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. 16 The mission also supports the Transitional Federal Government's Forces against al Shabaab militants with a renewable six month mandate. In the months that followed the ICU was ejected from 
Al Shabaab Leadership
Al Shabaab's leadership is called the Shura Council. 17 The key members of this organization are Ahmed Abdi Godane (Mukhtar Abu Zubair) who is the leader (emir). 
He hails from Hargeisa in

Al Shabaab Strategic Objectives
Al Shabaab's interests are a matter of speculation while the group's vision seems to be global jihad. 18 The strategic goal of the group remains to establish a Somali Islamic caliphate in the entire Horn of Africa, a nation-state for the "Quran". 19 Their intent is to win the support and galvanize the Somali people against the Americans, Ethiopians, Kenyans, Ugandans, AMISOM forces, and non-Muslims who are labeled as 24 The local religious leaders, mosques, and community networks also provide financial support for logistics and operations including provisions for sustenance. 25 In manpower, it is estimated that between six thousand to seven thousand fighters make up al Shabaab 26 and it is estimated that between seven hundred and fifty to one thousand of them are foreign fighters. 27 in the busy and well stocked malls in this area of Nairobi. It is also a statement to Kenyan authorities that they are within reach of lucrative targets and that they are unable to protect their population. This is a clear challenge that presents the security organizations with an opportunity to reevaluate security strategy.
Small Arms, light weapons proliferation, and IEDs are a security dilemma posed by al Shabaab. Somalia has become the major source of most of the illegal arms in Kenya, as they are smuggled cross the porous borders. The availability of these weapons lead to increasing insecurity, as well as increased incidents of cattle rustling and robbery with violence leading to the deaths of women and children, security agents and the raiders, injuries, loss of property and displacement of Kenyan citizens. 31 Currently there are over six hundred thousand illicit arms in circulation in the country, according to a survey conducted in Kenya on small arms by a Geneva based small arms survey group. 32 These weapons find their way into other countries, such as Uganda, Tanzania and the Democratic Republic of Congo leading to violent crimes in these countries too.
Another threat posed by al Shabaab is in the form of a weapon and method available to them and critical in terms of inflicting casualties, specifically the improvised explosive devices (IED). Al Shabaab will continue to use it against regional peacekeeping forces in Somalia and in attacks in countries that contribute troops to try and put pressure on these governments and public opinion to pull their forces out of Somalia. It is important for contributing countries to leverage and align efforts both within Somalia and in home countries by sharing information and intelligence.
The lack of institutions of governance in Somalia due to the menace of al Shabaab has created a breeding ground for pirates who frequently interfere with sea trade and commerce. This has led to increases in the cost of shipping due to increases in the cost of insurance and security escorts. As a result, the cost of imports went up, which affected the economies of Kenya and the region. This includes the global trade to and from Asia that uses these routes through the Indian Ocean. However, since AMISOM's capture and control of Kisumayo and Operation Atlanta conducted by the 16 European Union (EU) Naval Force to take disruptive action against pirate bases on shore, the rate of piracy has gone down in the Horn of Africa and off the Somali coast. 33 During Al Shabaab also poses a threat because they target refugee camps and mosques for recruitment of exploitable youth. Some radical Muslim clerics urge the youth to join. Eastleigh in Nairobi is one of the areas where agents recruit kids who end up going to join al Shabaab in Somalia to fight. 36 The main root causes for joining are unemployment, illiteracy, poverty, economic marginalization and ideology, strong brotherhood bonds, sense of belongings, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and social status benefits. Recruiters are able to entice their recruitment targets through the use of propaganda. 37 Some youth are made to believe that al Shabaab is fighting to maintain their values and way of life. 38 As a result these youth are radicalized and Islamized and become enemies of their own people by being sent back to attack targets at home. Several have been arrested from across all ethnic tribes and prosecuted.Money laundering using "hawala", an informal money transfer system, is the mode used by al Shabaab and Somalis to transact currency in Eastleigh and Nairobi.
Within minutes of a transaction's completion, it finds its way to Somalia through the purchase of goods in Kenya and through the porous borders along the Kenya-Somalia border. 39 The government ends up losing tax revenue to this unorthodox monetary system of transfer that is not accountable in its dealings. The lack of transparency makes it impossible to develop a strategy for countering it, as transactions cannot be monitored or traced.
The kidnapping of two aid workers with Medicine San Frontiers in Sept 2011 from
Dadaab refugee camp, the shooting and killing of the British tourist Tebbut, and the kidnapping of his French wife Judith in October 2011 from Lamu prompted the Kenyan authorities to react to these violations of its territorial integrity and pursue its national interests by sending troops across the border to secure and defend territorial integrity and deny al Shabaab freedom of movement and action. As a result of these types of terrorist and criminal acts, the Kenyan tourism industry was negatively affected with a corresponding impact on Kenya's economy. This was too much to bear as tourism is Kenya's largest source of foreign revenue. It brings in approximately $500 million in annual earnings. 40 The impact of terrorism on tourism has a multiplier effect due to the loss of jobs, unemployment, and poverty. 41 This was infringing on Kenya's survival interests. It was for this reason that Kenya chose to actin order to safe guard its interests at all cost. Another source of al Shabaab's strengths is the ability to fundraise from Muslim charitable foundations, the Gulf States, and the Somali diaspora to finance and sustain its operations. 45 These strengths must be targeted and through employing strategies that capture the across the spectrum of national elements of power: military, diplomatic, informational and economic. Al Shabaab's weakness is a lack of credibility and just cause as demonstrated through its conduct such as the unjustified terror activities, the whipping of women and public executions, forced marriages between Somali women and foreign fighters, and a lack of support from the people. 46 There is a need for AMISOM and its partners to exploit this weakness in order to win the war against the militia. The interference of Somali pirates with these sea routes will affect global sea trade that flows through the Indian Ocean. This will lead to an increase in the cost of security escorts and the cost of insurance for the shipping industry. This in turn translates to a higher cost for imported products. It will also have a negative impact on the interests of the people in the region as they will be unable to realize and achieve their goals in such a hostile environment. Development in socio-economic sectors, infrastructure, electricity, water and sanitations, road construction, schools and hospitals will stagnate. Refugees will increase as people seek safer havens. An unstable Somalia would pull in both actors and spoilers within Somalia and from the region leading to a complex regional conflict that could destabilize the entire region and beyond.
22
The Kenyan Response Kenya would like to promote democracy, security, peace and stability in the region as it is the regional hub of trade, commerce and information technology.
Instability in the region would compromise the achievements across the entire socioeconomic sector. That is why it supported TFG, has hosted refugees, and continues to play a part in providing peacekeeping forces. Kenya promotes opportunities and development for its people in order to create jobs to meet the youth bulge challenge, advance peace and security through agreements with its neighbors by encouraging bilateral and multilateral military exercises. It also promotes economic growth through regional economic partnership and establishing trading blocks in order to pull up weaker economies and ensure fair trading practices amongst member states to create opportunities for its people and eradicate poverty.
Kenya has also passed anti-terrorism legislation known as the counter-terrorism financing bill, which will regulate financial transactions and stop money laundering. It will also make it an offence for any individual or organization to open, operate, finance, recruit or assist any person or organization engaged in terrorist activities. The law will also ensure effective prosecution of terrorists and their agents. Kenya also has an established counter terrorism centre where it trains its personnel from all security agencies in order to competently address the emerging terror threats and trends.
The Kenya Defense Forces have been on the fore front in fighting al Shabaab and effectively dislodging them from their strongholds in southern Somalia as part of the Global War on Terror. The Kenyan Navy has been actively involved in counter piracy operations in the nation's economic exclusion zone and beyond to ensure freedom of navigation and denial of access to the pirates.
In addressing the refugee challenges the Ministry of Immigration is working in liaison with UNHCR as part of the interagency cooperation and coordination to ensure the observation of international conventions in regard to refugees without compromising security. The government through banks and financial institutions is offering the women and youth interest free funds for loans in order to undertake income generating projects as a way of promoting small scale enterprises and poverty eradication. The Kenyan leadership is adhering to good governance and accountability to ensure security forces are well trained and properly resourced to be able to effectively deal with emerging security challenges. They are also involved with capacity building to tackle the ever changing security threats by embracing new technologies, including those intended to deter cyber crime. Kenyan leadership has also embarked on an interagency counter terrorism program, as well as information sharing in order to identify and effectively target terrorists; especially terrorist group leadership. Finally, Kenya is also encouraging military leaders to discuss issues and conduct joint counter terrorism exercises and training with allies and partners like exercise Natural Fire with US AFRICOM and other East African nations as a way of sharing knowledge, building trust, and shaping the region.
Conclusion: the Regional Challenges of Somalia and the Way Ahead As the regional partners through AMISOM confront the threats that al Shabaab poses and turn them into challenges and those challenges into opportunities, the main challenges that the region faces will remain within and related to Somalia. While al 24 Shabaab has lost ground and must be eliminated in order to stabilize Somalia. One of the first things that must be addressed is the lack of trust among some of the regional states; especially those perceived to have been supporting al Shabaab like Eritrea and many of the Arab Gulf states. The challenge of manpower and logistics must also be addressed. It will be necessary for regional actors to be able to adequately resource their endeavors to stabilize all of Somalia. It is not enough just to secure towns. In order to be successful in dealing with the threats that originate from within Somalia it is necessary to engage and pacify the entire country to prevent al Shabaab from establishing bases in remote areas and using them to plan and launch attacks. It is also important to get accurate and timely information on the enemy to enable effective responses. Finally the Regional armies' divergent interests must be mitigated in order to not negatively affect the coalition's cohesion and the ability to conduct operations.
As a military specialist, it is important to develop and employ instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated way in a joint, intergovernmental, interagency, and multinational manner by balancing ways and means to achieve a stable Somalia as the key to achieving security and establishing enduring peace, stability, and prosperity in the region. I recommend that diplomatically, the United Nations, AU, and the international community should call upon all regional countries who are stake holders, including the Arab Gulf states, to support the newly elected financial support to enable the running of the government departments and programs and ensure proper monetary discipline. The regional nations should admit Somalia into the regional economic and trading blocks to encourage regional trade and provide a market for its products to enable its economy to pick up. It will also be necessary to train troops before deployment and educate law enforcement in order to broaden the understanding of how to prevent, detect, protect and respond to improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). By securing borders and training border patrol personnel in more effective security measures and the screening of refugees it will be possible to separate out the criminal element from the legitimate refugees before they can be registered and find their way into Kenya through the refugee camps. It is also necessary to increase job opportunities for Somali youth, which will reduce their exploitability by al 27 Shabaab. The current achievements by the international community and AMISOM forces are commendable; however they are not an end by themselves. The threat from al Shabaab is likely to remain moderate in the region despite the gains achieved.
However, it should lessen as democratic institutions and the rule of law begin to take shape in Somalia and as challenges affecting the larger part of the region's population and communities are attended to. These gains can be achieved through governmental, bilateral, and multilateral approaches that are inclusive of regional governments, the international community, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector in order to realize opportunities presented for Kenya and regional partners and build a secure and prosperous region.
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